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THE HEARSAY SYSTEM: AROUND AND THROUGH
THE THICKET
JOHN M. MAGUIRE*
INTRODUCTION

All these complicated rules about hearsay are very strange for us, our
judges having the right to evaluate the importance of what a witness
says or a paper may prove. In this regard, the position of our judges is
much freer than yours; in general a German judge can refuse any means
of evidence only if he thinks that the fact to be proved is without relevance to the case, or if he accepts the fact to be proved as true, or if the
evidence cannot be reached or in his opinion is only designed to delay
the procedure. The administration of these rules is controlled by the
Supreme Court and as far as I can see we do not have any difficulties in
this field.

The foregoing sentences are quoted from a letter written in 1960
by a skilled and scholarly West German lawyer after he had read
an elementary American textbook on Evidence. They speak for
themselves-and, according to the thought of a good many practitioners in the United States, speak persuasively by suggesting that our
treatment of hearsay evidence entangles us in an unintelligible
thicket. Such became, the writer believes, the common view of most
persons who worked seriously on the American Law Institute's Model
Code of Evidence.
But history, down to date, of the Code and of its modified offspring,
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, shows that their respective solutions
of this particular problem were too radical for quick general adoption.1 It is, after all, typical in these days of the common law's maturity that the pace of important procedural change should be deliberate.
* Royall Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School; member of
Massachusetts Bar; practicing in Boston.
1. The American Law Institute's MODEL CODE OF EViDENCE rules 501 et seq.

(1942), sweepingly provided for admissibility of a large number of hearsay
statements solely and simply on the ground of unavailability of the declarants
who had uttered them. Far more cautiously, although with greater liberality
of admission than prevails under existing practice, the National Conferenceof Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in its UwFomvI Ruis or EVIDENCE
62 et seq., left hearsay subject to objection and exclusion except so far as
numerous carefully drafted exceptions applied. As of the time of writing, no
jurisdiction has adopted the technique of the MODEL CODE, and only a single
jurisdiction, namely the Virgin Islands, has substantially gone along with the
UNIFORM RULEs in their treatment of hearsay evidence. 1 VIRGIN IsLANDs CODE,
tit. 5, c. 67, §§ 931-35 (1957). In New Jersey, however, serious consideration
is being given to the question of adoption through combined legislative and
judicial action. 1960 N.J. SEss. LAw SERv., Reg. Sess., c. 52. See also references
given in Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity and the Uniform Rules: A
Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204 (1960), by the first five
footnotes.
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Professional fear of explosive disruption by sudden acceptance of
fundamental analytical attack upon things as they are is far from
baseless. Our traditional attitude of disapproval toward hearsay,
even though manifested in practice with much disregard of logical
consistency, does have elements of solid merit which ought not to be
casually sacrificed. 2 Recurring to the metaphor already suggested,
the unintelligible thicket may call for bramble-clearing and careful
landscape architecture rather than burning the bushes.
Obviously with lively appreciation of these considerations, several
highly capable American commentators, writing both shortly before
and during the years after promulgation of the Model Code, have
published historical and analytical studies of bedrock factors involved
in the hearsay rule.3 This paper is to a large extent reiterative of
what they well say, but also includes some attempt to extend and
broaden their suggestions. Because these earlier writers have so
skillfully dug out and arranged the rudimental case materials, the
immediate treatment is not smothered in citations.
The job on hand may be approached in two ways: (1) getting
around the hearsay thicket by so defining its outer limits as to put
beyond them at least a moderate quantity of useful evidence now
dubiously classified; and (2) getting through the thicket by broadening exceptions to the exclusionary rule into thoroughfares which
will carry more traffic than do present twisting cowpaths. 4 As will
become apparent, the underlying reasons for both definitional limitation and exception-making are so largely identical that they tend to
merge. Discussion falls into four divisions. We begin with a survey
of the place of hearsay in the evidential scheme, with comment upon
its characteristic defects. This is quite completely non-contentious and
familiar, but requires explicit statement as leading up to highly
2. For instance, it keeps inquiry and information much more tightly on point
than does a proliferating investigation of what X asserted to W that Y had
told X. See the quotation from an undisclosed but respected "heresiarch" in
MAGuiE, EviDENCE: COMMON SsSE Am COMMON LAW, 149 (1947).
3. Studies which have especially stimulated the present writer include
McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489 (1930) (a competent piece of exploration) [hereafter cited as McCormick, Borderland]; Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, 89 U. PA. L. Rv. 192 (1940) (a carefully pointed commentary, with implication of considerable possible expansion) [hereafter cited
as Falknor, Silence]; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948) (the fruit of thinking hard and
then rethinking) [hereafter cited as Morgan, Hearsay Dangers]; Rucker, The
Twilight Zone of Hearsay, 9 VAND. L. REv. 453 (1956) (broad survey raising
many considerations); Cross, The Scope of the Rule Against Hearsay, 72 L.Q.
REv. 91 (1956) (indicating very little judicial analytical progress in England
since 1838).
4. There seems to be at least a suggestion from the very best source that
if the awesome possible coverage of hearsay haggling were made clear to the
judges, they would insist upon broadening the cowpaths. Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers, 62 HAav. L. REV. 177, 218-19 (1948).
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contentious matters beyond. Next, there is a description and criticism
of the one full-dress leading definitional case. Third, a proposal is
made of what is termed a functioning definition of hearsay. And
fourth, there follows a very condensed commentary on the exceptionmaking process, covering present condition and current development.
I. SHORTCOMINGS OF TESTIMONIAL EvIDENCE
Hearsay is one kind of narrative or testimonial evidence, using the
latter term broadly to cover showings of human behavior which
transmit or communicate ideas from one person to another, commonly
by verbal means but quite often by other means. Communication may
be intentional or unintentional. When intentional, communication
nearly always involves conscious formulation of ideas. But conscious
formulation may occur without immediate communication. Ideas may
be verbalized and expressed in a secret diary, or framed-perhaps in
unuttered language-by mere inner operation of the human mind.5
Behind the formulation of ideas lies, of course, the process of acquiring
information, and the whole sequence of sensory, mental, and demonstrative processes from acquisition to ultimate transmission must be
considered in gauging the reliability of various types of testimonial
evidence.
Under the view enforced by our law of trial, hearsay has come to
be habitually downgraded as a means of proof. With us, the standard
presentation of narrative is of supposedly superior quality by witnesses on hand in person to establish solely such matters as they have
themselves observed.
Even in this carefully supervised form, testimonial evidence is
usually a decidedly inferior substitute for direct current observation
of the facts at issue.6 Inherently it suffers from easily appreciated
physical and psychological weaknesses. The clearest familiar judicial
listing of these weaknesses is found in discussions of admissibility of
5. As to whether in such circumstances, even without subjective verbalization, hearsay problems must be faced, see pp. 772 et seq., infra; see also Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 214-15 (1948).

Often, of course,

where observation leads to an immediate inner decision manifested by quick
action other than a declaratory statement something fairly analogous to a
spontaneous assertion is brought about, and appeal to the familiar hearsay
exception for this sort of declaration is valid. Cf. note 77 infra.
6. The most obvious departure from this generalization appears in expert
testimony. Testimony by an expert observer as to what he perceived when
carefully scrutinizing a phenomenon is almost certain to be superior in probative value to the product of direct scrutiny of the same phenomenon by
unskilled jurymen. A significant illustration of the general proposition stated
in the text is the varying regard with respect to due process as between
summary trial and punishment for (a) contempts committed within sight
and hearing of the judge and (b) contempts committed otherwise. In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 274-76 (1948); cf. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610
(1960), rehearingdenied, 363 U.S. 858 (1960).

.744
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testimony by young children.
Momentarily centering attention upon the child witness, we find
four items in the catalogue of his weaknesses: 7
First,risk of faulty perception.8
9
Second, risk of defective, confused, or distorted memory.
Third, risk of a general propensity or particular inclination to express and communicate inexactly such memory or other mental or
physical state as does exist. A convenient term for this third item is
failure or lack of sincerity.

Fourth,and finally, risk that the child narrator, although striving to
7. Illustrative cases include Commonwealth v. Tatisos, 238 Mass. 322, 130
N.E. 495 (1921) (full and specific presentation); Maynard v. Keough, 145
Minn. 26, 175 N.W. 891 (1920) (brief but pointed); State v. Statler, 331 S.W.2d

526, 528-29 (Mo. 1960) (explicit formula, according to text above, quoted
from earlier opinion); Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 619-24, 156 A.2d 307,
309-12 (1959) (full and specific presentation); cf. State v. Butler, 32 N.J. 166,
189-95, 160 A.2d 8, 20-25 (1960) (witness claimed to be mentally defective
-and unworthy of belief; explicit formula according to text above; full presentation). Sometimes not all the factors are specifically mentioned, those
unmentioned being taken for granted or relegated to the background by
reason of particular facts. Litzkuhn v. Clark, 85 Ariz. 355, 359-60, 339 P.2d
389, 392 (1959) (error in summarily refusing to hear child of six with
respect to event occurring when the child was five; factors mentioned: ability
,to receive and truly narrate just impressions of the facts); People v. Pike, 7
Cal. Rptr. 188 (Cal. App. 1960) (factors mentioned: recollection and narration; perception obviously implied); People v. Burton, 6 Cal. Rptr. 124, 129
(factors mentioned: ability to receive and truly relate just
- (Cal. App. 1960)
impressions of facts, and realization that evil would result from telling lies);
Wozniak v. Luta, 103 N.W.2d 870, 873, 875 (Minn. 1960) (not abuse of discretion to refuse to receive testimony of boy aged eight about accident suffered
when he was five; perception and memory obviously the disqualifying weak
points, since boy was allowed to testify "as to his complaints at the time of
the trial"); Artesani v. Gritton, 252 N.C. 463, 113 S.E.2d 895, 897-899 (1960)
(error to disqualify solely on ground of chronological age child of seven
years and three months with respect to accident suffered when of four years
and eight months; factors mentioned: capacity to understand and relate under
obligation of oath; full discussion).
The Butler case above correctly suggests close connection of the testimonial
problems of children and of mental defectives. With the latter, however,
one encounters special medical problems, presumptions from commitment
to institutions, etc., which blur the elemental analysis.
8. The term "faulty perception" is meant to cover every kind of fault from
complete lack of any observation through all sorts of major and minor
misperceptions and nonperceptions; also of course every kind of sensory
perception with or without artificial aids. Further, it is meant to apply
whenever, although the senses are brought to bear on phenomena, understanding or comprehension of what is perceived is more or less lacking.
9. Here again the terminology is meant to be sweeping, covering drop-outs
in recollection; transposition of dates, persons, episodes, and what not,
whether by way of subtraction or addition; and all sorts of deviations in size,
proportion, or significance. This weakness can often, in the case of ordinary
adult witnesses, be obviated or lessened by prompt preparation of memoranda. See Maguire and Quick, Testimony: Memory and Memoranda, 3 How.
L.J. 1 (1957). It must be borne in mind that much significant testimony does
not involve memory at all, because it is a purported description of such concurrent things as pain, fear, belief, like or dislike, intention, and so on.
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convey a correct account, may be incapable of exact verbalization."0
The result of such incapacity will often resemble the result of
insincerity. Fundamentally, though, the two risks are different. A
purely verbalistic shortcoming, unlike an uttered deviation from
actual belief, has no moral content. It is failure in form, not failure in
spirit. We have here a feature of attempted communication which
presents a double-ended hazard, involving not only capability of the
person who seeks to express a proposition of fact but also capability
of any person who seeks to grasp correctly the intended meaning.1 '
With the latter capability, important as it is, this paper makes no
attempt to grapple.
Several comments of major significance a're needed to put the preceding paragraph in proper setting for purposes of the present discussion. First, the quadripart analysis, here offered only with respect
to witness competency, properly runs through the whole topic of
testimonial evidence.' 2 It bears strongly upon both bolstering and
impeachment of ordinary witness stand testimony, and has fundamental significance, sometimes only fractionally perceived, in handling hearsay evidence. Second, the four potential factors of weakness are scarcely of equal or unvarying importance from either the
point of view of an intelligent layman applying common sense to
these problems or of a lawyer applying technical learning and skill.
For instance, aside from the young child with a limited and unanchored vocabulary, or the foreigner deficient in the common lbcal
tongue yet attempting to use it when testifying, the risk of inexact
verbalization is not commonly very threatening. This inequality and
variability of risk will at a later point be pursued in other applications.
Next, while any proposed witness must, to be acceptable, have some
power or fall under some sanction adequate to avoid or diminish each
of the testimonial risks enumerated above, his evidence may be received despite great likelihood of infirmity on one or more of the
10. As will appear later, the word "narrator" is too narrow in ordinary
connotation to suggest all the forms of communication belonging within the
concept at the base of the present discussion. See pp. 772-73 infra. For the
moment it is enough to remark that propositions of fact may be purposely
conveyed from one mind to another by means of expression not involving
words either spoken or written.
11. Thus Thoreau's famous sentence, quoted by the late Mr. Justice Jackson,
Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations, 37 A.B.A.J. 801, 863 (1951): "It takes two to speak the truth,-one to
speak, and another to hear."
12. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 478 (3d ed. 1940), cuts the number by one, combining the third and fourth enumerated in the text. Falknor, Silence, 89 U.
PA. L. REV. at 194 (1940), and Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, 62 HARV. L. REV. at
178-79, 185-88 (1948), adhere to the full four. In typical Anglo-American
judicial discussions of hearsay and testimonial evidence at large, the thirdsincerity-has received what may well be exaggerated emphasis; the fourthinexact verbalization-is often passed over as of rare significance.
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four grounds. This is commendable because a judge or juror, in
finding facts, needs all the helpful information he can get, and is
supposed to use his shrewdness to distinguish between sound, on the
one hand, and dubious or even flatly misleading information, on the
other. There is indeed a strong and growing general tendency to
accept the vast bulk of testimony, subject to critical appraisal by the
trier of fact, rather than to declare even a frail witness incompetent
because of belief that he was a slipshod observer, has an unreliable
memory, is inclined to falsify with respect to the subject-matter
being investigated, or (perhaps and) suffers from limited power to
communicate his ideas.
But even the most capable witness, and still more the one of
questionable reliability, is subject to impeachment. While conduct
of witness impeachment is susceptible to infinite skilled variation,
furnishing one of the most severe tests for trial judgment and
ingenuity, the bare bones of its technique are hard and definite. Their
13
modeling traces back to the testimonial risks previously listed.
So, too, does much of the modeling of the processes for corroborating
or rehabilitating witnesses.14 In other words, the testing of a compe13. This is most easily demonstrated by running the outlines of a differentiation familiar to every trial lawyer. He knows that subject to discretionary
restraint by the trial judge he has a fairly free field on cross-examination for
purposes of casting doubt upon the credibility of witnesses put forward by
his opponent. But he also knows that if the results of cross-examination do
not satisfy him, he will be definitely restricted in introducing extrinsic
impeaching evidence. He may, by proper procedure, utilize the following:
(1) Evidence of conviction of opponent's witnesses for crime (commonly
confined to convictions for misconduct involving moral turpitude); this evidence is assumed to have an adverse bearing upon sincerity. (2) Evidence of
bad reputation for truth and veracity; again, a bearing upon sincerity. (3)
Evidence tending to show bias with respect to present parties litigant or one
or more of the issues on trial; once more, sincerity. (4) Evidence of prior
inconsistent statements by the witnesses with respect to material or "noncollateral" aspects of their testimony (definition of "material," "non-collateral," and other supposedly corresponding limiting words is difficult, but
that difficulty need not be pursued here); this may bear adversely on sincerity, or it may bear adversely upon accuracy of observation or of memory.
(5) Evidence of inability to observe, for lack of opportunity, defective powers
of observation, etc.; this has a direct bearing upon perception, and quite
possibly an indirect bearing upon memory or sincerity if the testimony of the
witness has indicated exact detail of perception. These are the stereotyped
permissible lines of extrinsic attack; under particular circumstances the
impeaching lawyer may win the trial judge's permission to go into other
miscellaneous areas, and an appellate court may acquiesce.
14. E.g., evidence of good reputation for truth and veracity-the obvious
primary bearing is upon sincerity; evidence of earlier statement consistent
with testimony, introduced to offset a cross-examiner's claim of "recent
invention"-the bearing may be upon sincerity, power of memory, or accuracy
of observation, disjunctively or conjunctively; cross-examiner charges witness
with falsification because of self-interest, and proponent of witness introduces
evidence that witness made a thoroughly consistent statement before any selfinterest existed or was anticipated-the bearing normally is on sincerity;
cross-examiner attacks testimony of witness to assault on ground that fragments of broken eyeglasses had lodged in his eyes, and proponent of witness
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tent witness for purposes of appraising his evidence has as its underpinning the selfsame considerations invoked to determine his physical, mental, and moral competency.
All this discussion of ordinary witness stand testimony is of course
only preliminary. We are concerned with hearsay, matter so different
that in our law it has been given a distinct and unfavorable classification. The difference is familiar and fairly easy to state, and involves
no departure from, but rather a compounding of, the four fundamental
criteria of testimonial credibility.
If we seek to prove that a blow was struck, or a slanderous statement uttered, and for this purpose adduce a witness who testifies that
he was present and heard or saw the action, the testimony can duly,
and often with great fullness, receive framing and backing which will
help judge or jury decide how much or how little reliance it deserves.
Acuity of the witness's sight or hearing can be inquired into and
tested on cross-examination or otherwise. The vital fact of his presence within seeing or hearing distance can be probed. His attention
or inattention at the crucial moment lies open to inquiry. Effective
exploration of interest or bias with respect to the particular issue or
parties litigant is frequently possible-e.g., he may have been charged,
or may fear being charged, with participation in the beating of the
plaintiff, or the defendant may be a person whom he hates. The
reader will perceive without more words that this list of relevant
modifying circumstances is naturally extendible to the full limit of
accepted practices respecting impeachment or fortifying or re-establishing of witnesses.
Now suppose the witness in the case of Robinson v. Smith proposes
to testify that Tom Jones-not present in court-told him Smith hit
Robinson, or that the absentee Jones purported to quote Smith as
having said Robinson stole a leg of lamb from the corner provision
merchant. 15 Under such circumstances counsel find it harder to give
effective depth and color to any picture of Jones' credibility. 16 Of
course it is permissible to contradict hearsay by counter-evidence, and
theoretically possible to impeach it by applying various techniques
introduces testimony of eye specialist whom witness consulted after the
episode that fragments did not impair vision-the bearing is certainly on
ability to perceive and perhaps on sincerity; etc.
15. A special question arises if Tom Jones is present and open to crossexamination;see pp. 767 et seq., infra.
16. The text speaks mainly in terms of effective attack upon the cogency
of hearsay evidence. Of course there is likely to be corresponding difficulty
in legitimately strengthening it. A hearsay declarant may have consulted
adequate memoranda for refreshment of recollection, for instance; but
assuming the condition of declarant's unavailability which is the most
common reason for resorting to hearsay, such consultation may not be ascertainable, much less provable.
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usable against a witness present on the stand. 17 But only crossexamination is likely to reveal some important sources of contradiction, many of the impeaching leads, and much of the impeaching
substance. Thus hearsay, even though the person asserted to have
uttered it is but once removed 18 from the witness who testifies to its
content, is essentially more subject to latent narrative or testimonial
weakness than is direct testimony from a living person claiming to
have perceived the matters at issue. This might have had most
severe exclusionary consequences by producing the following rule:
Any possible shortcoming in perception, memory, sincerity, or
precision of interpretation, even though it would suffice only to
impeach, not disqualify, the testimony of a witness in court, will
cause classification as inadmissible hearsay of a communication
made outside the sanctions imposed upon such a witness.
Of course no such stringent rule exists. But when anybody seeks
authoritatively to establish how far, and on the basis of what recognized principles, the current designation of inadmissible hearsay falls
short of this stringency, simplicity and certitude are hard to attain.
Respective significance of the four standard testimonial risks is usually unstated or at best obscurely handled. An approach, at least, can
be essayed by bracketing an affirmative formula and a matching
negative formula of which the first has substantially unanimous, and
the second at least respectable, support from case law and professional
thinking.
The affirmative formula is: Hearsay invariably constitutes a present
problem when extrajudicial human behavior is sought to be proved
as tending to establish a proposition of fact which the actor intended
his behavior to communicate or at least express.19 The negative
formula is: Hearsay never constitutes a present problem unless
human behavior is sought to be proved for the particular purpose
just stated. As a practical application of this formula, the most familiar case uses human behavior to prove the desired proposition of fact
17. Subject, of course, to such handicaps as may be presented by the

requirement of "laying a foundation" for admission of extrinsic evidence of
self-contradiction by the declarant.
18. Compound or multiple hearsay, coming down through a succession of
declarants, or assembled bit by bit from a number of declarants, is obviously
a still more rickety probative vehicle.
19. Freak cases turn up at intervals, but need not be taken too seriously.
E.g., Johnson v. State, 254 Wis. 320, 326, 36 N.W.2d 86, 89 (1949) (identification
by boy of defendant as man who had mistreated the boy; police officer picked
up boy so that he could see defendant through one-way glass at police station
"and he pointed this Mr. Johnson out as the man who had him in the park";
such testimony by officer not hearsay; "testifying to something he saw, something Richard did in his presence .. .relying on what he observed and not
what the boy told him").
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only by inference as contrasted with assertion. This is fairly commonly accepted, particularly if the term "assertion" is taken to
include declaratory gestures. Certainly it would be a rather natural
consequence of early talk about the general hearsay exclusionary
principle, and early development of recognized exceptions to it, because the weight of emphasis was so much on the peril of insincerity
as the prime testimonial frailty.20 In assertive testimonial evidence,*
sincerity is nearly always involved.21 Remove the factor of assertion,
and risk of insincerity normally vanishes simultaneously. Definition
along this line shrinks risks of faulty perception, of blank or unruly
memory, of imprecise verbalization to the size of defects regrettable
but not fatal. Arguments in favor of such drastic shrinkage certainly
exist, and are known to every student of evidence, but many thoughtful lawyers fear it more than they dislike even our present tangle of
uncertainties and restrictions. Can a satisfactory middle course, giving some reasonable and practicable recognition to risks other than
that of insincerity, be derived from available material? Let search
for an answer to this question start with examination of the single
great leading case, now aged very near a century and a quarter, and
lead on to some consideration of hit-or-miss modern authority.

II. THE HEARSAY

RULE AND INFERENcES FROM

HUMAN BEHAVIOR

In 1822 an English country gentleman named John Marsden made
a purported will of great elaboration, following up in 1825 with a
simple codicil. By these instruments, coupled with his death during
1826, Mr. Marsden started in the courts 22 and local society 23 a really
20. Probably it would be unfair to assert that the English judiciary of the
development period assumed declarants would lie at the drop of a hat; but
there was certainly an assumption that very slight material or emotional
temptation would tend to induce mendacity. Consult the old cases conveniently collected in THAYER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON

LAW, 354, 373-78, 416-17, 474-76, 507-08, and elsewhere (2d ed. 1900); cf.
COWEN & CARTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW Or EVIDENCE, 8, 23-37, 39 (1956),

sug-

gesting some continuance of this view beyond the middle of the 20th century.
21. A shade of qualification must be indulged. Imagine a literally spontaneous declaratory exclamation, springing from the speaker under the
impulse of excitement or horror.
22. The fullest professional account of the situation is A VERBATIM REPORT
OF =H CAUSE DOE DEM. TATHAM V. WRIGHT, TRIED AT THE LAMMAS AssizEs,
1834, BEFORE MR. BARON GURNEY AND A SPECIAL JURY (1834), two volumes of
371 and 360 pages respectively. For convenient brevity this account is hereafter referred to as V.R. The compiler of these volumes was Alexander Fraser
of Clifford's Inn, the accredited reporter in the case. This is the third of the
four trials mentioned in the text. The London Morning Chronicle for September 3, 1834 remarks that mortality of witnesses had been heavy, and that Mr.
Fraser by producing transcripts of prior testimony saved bar and bench from a
sea of troubles. Incidentally, by this time so many leaders of the bar, since elevated to the bench, had previously represented one side or the other that it
was difficult to find a judge of appropriate detachment to preside. The Times
(London), September 1, 1834. The Chronicle on August 26, 1834 speaks of
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astounding rumpus. Thanks not only to the ordinary law reports but
also to a printed verbatim report of one of the four trials, we know a
good deal about Mr. Marsden and can believe that the widely publicized litigation would have shocked him. The evidence, not entirely
uniform, would support this description:
He was a mild, polite, shrinking, shortish man, not bad-looking and
with "fresh colour," rather afraid of dogs, big or little, at ground level
and of horses when he attained the elevation of the saddle. Although
friendly and hospitable, he did not carve well enough to meet the
demands of a table at which many were habitually served. So myopic
that he could not recognize people even a few yards away, he had a
habit of contracting his brows and distorting his face to overcome
the visual difficulty. He was quite uneducated, entirely unmarried,
and sometimes bumbling in the presence of ladies. The ringing of
bells fascinated him; so did check aprons worn by the servant
maids. He took an interest in music, but the variety of his performance and tastes was too limited to give others much joy. He did
become well-informed and competent as a genealogist, having a
tenacious memory; and was also something of a drum-and-trumpet
military historian. 24 His religion and politics were conservative.
"the great will case"; Mr. Baron Gurney opened his summing up on September 3, 1834 with: "Gentlemen of the Jury-This great cause ....

"

2 V.R. 295.

Will and codicil are fully printed in 2 V.R. 346-56.
23. Toward the end of the 1834 trial the Chronicle for September 3 asserted
that interest in the matter hourly increased and that the controversy had
actually become a local party question; also that no expense was being
spared on either side. This source had previously estimated the cost of the
pending trial at £10,000. Chronicle, August 26, 1834. The principal property
at issue, a great country estate complete with Hornby Castle (which rose to
the dignity of water closets in 1811 or 1812, 2 V.R. 152-53), commons, mines,
fisheries, manorial rights, and all the trimmings (1 V.R. 137, 149, 161), was
according to one 1834 estimate worth £8,000 a year; this shrank to £7,000
and upward; then there was an admission that, because of depression in the
value of agricultural produce, current realization was under £5,000 annually
-still something substantial. Chronicle, August 26 and 28, 1834; Times, September 1, 1834. The jury, as listed in 1 V.R. 1, is obviously of blue ribbon
quality-preponderantly merchants in the proportion of ten to the dozen; the
other two are labeled 'Esq."; as the jurors were about to retire after the
summing up, one of the merchants received word that his mother had died,
and was excused by common consent (2 V.R. 343-44). During the trial, this
occurred: "Gurney, B. -I will not have this court made a scene of disturbance, and therefore if there be any symptoms of it renewed, I will clear it."
1 V.R. 243. Hence it seems to have been discreet to hold the first of the four
trials-on directed jury issues out of Chancery-at York on account of prejudice supposed to prevail in Lancashire, where John Marsden had lived. Wright
v. Doe d. Tatham, 7 Ad. & E. 313, 314, 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 489 n. (a) (K.B.
1837). Mr. Justice James Allan Park presided at York, and there were
collisions between him and Brougham; the handling of this trial came in
for acid criticism by Admiral Tatham's counsel in 1834. 1 V.R. 273; 2 id. 77.
24. Aside from this incidental military touch and a sartorial flurry about
uniforms for a volunteer regiment which never materialized (2 V.R. 101-02,
104), the VERBATiM REPORT reflects little of the prodigious political and mili-

tary struggle which went on through a large part of John Marsden's life.
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Riding grandly by carriage, he led his freemen to the polls on election
days. Indecisive, slow of perception, submissive, and indolent, he
relied much upon his steward Wright, a positive and unlovable man
who, as a principal testamentary beneficiary, became a target of
attack in the court proceedings.2 Since, by the early death of his
elder brother, Mr. Marsden inherited substantial properties, in one
way or another he was drawn into many acquisitive dealings. All in
all, it was not too surprising that his cousin and sole heir-at-law
Admiral Tatham should promptly, vigorously, and tenaciously have
attacked the validity of the testamentary dispositions.2
John Marsden's mental competency was sharply drawn into issue.
The litigation came to its ultimate climatic focus in 1838 over a nice
point involving proper definition of hearsay evidence. Items adduced
to prove incompetency included testimony:
...that Marsden was treated as a child by his own menial servants;
that, in his youth, he was called, in the village where he lived, "Silly
Jack," and "Silly Marsden," . . ; that a witness had seen boys shouting
after him, "There goes crazy Marsden," and throwing dirt at him, and
had persuaded a person passing by to see him home... 27
No complaint was made over reception of this material. Evidence
adduced to prove competency included three letters, dated respectively in 1784, 1786, and 1799, addressed and sent to Marsden or his
steward Wright for Marsden's attention. The first was a friendly
Seemingly wars, even against Napoleon, were not then so disturbing to the
stay-at-homes.
25. The copious available trial record, much fuller than concurrent news-

paper reports, discloses testimony (frequently reiterative) from many
witnesses bearing upon the description given above. See the passages beginning at 1 V.R. 133, 184, 193, 350, 368; 2 id. 13, 47, 62, 103, 195, 212, also 259 for
an amusing exchange between Pollock and Starkie about Marsden's standards of horsemanship. James Lonsdale, a native of Lancaster and one of the
leading portraitists of the day (see DIcTioNARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY),
painted John Marsden about 1814, finding him "by no means a disagreeable
looking man" with "nothing at all repulsive" about him "until he spoke""I could get no conversation at all from him." 2 V.R. 208-09.
26. The persistence had to be pumped in from outside. Although during
the 1834 trial Admiral Tatham was the popular favorite (Chronicle, September 3) the Times on September 1 commented that the litigation was understood to be "now" carried on at the instance of a gentleman named Pudsey
Dawson, to whom the estate would descend on the death of Admiral Tatham,
already of an age "beyond the ordinary bound of human life" and without
issue. This is tantalizing. Somehow ' Pudsey" suggests money instead of
refinement; certainly he was none of the decorous Dawsons in the DicTIONARY
OF NATiONAL BIOGRAPHY; it may well be guessed that both the Times and its
readers knew more of him than we and history do; tracing devolution of
title to Hornsby Castle after the Admiral's legal victory in 1838 might be
interesting.
27. Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 7 Ad. & E. 313, 316, 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 490
(K.B. 1837). This part of the report seems to be summarizing the evidence
at the 1834 trial; 2 V.R. 136 has it: "There was a blacksmith called John
Greenwood passing by, and as I was on horseback I said, if he would take
Marsden up to Lister, he would get a pint of ale."
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letter from a cousin, telling about a voyage to America and the conditions found on arrival; the second, from the vicar of nearby Lancaster,
had to do with a legal controversy involving Marsden; the third,
from the curate of the chapelry of Hornby upon the occasion of his
resignation, expressed fulsome thanks for favors received.2 All were
on subject matters, and couched in language, suited to the understanding of a person having reasonable intelligence. All the writers had
died before trial. With respect to evidentiary utilization of these
letters as tending to prove belief of the writers that Marsden possessed
adequate understanding, and derivatively that he did in fact enjoy
such understanding, the controversy went all the way to the House
of Lords, eliciting opinions or statements of views from more than
17 judges-several of them famous legal personages.2
Here, then, was what might have been an almost miraculously
appointed opportunity for authoritative determination of the claim
that where there is no intentional communication of the proposition
at issue, where that proposition is come at only by inference, there
can be no hearsay. Time and approach seemed apt. As a general
exclusive principle, the hearsay rule was solidly established. The
foundations of the main exceptions admitting some assertive hearsay
had also been laid. Those exceptions certainly did not include anything covering the needs of the litigant offering the letters in the
immediate situation, nor does there appear in the long and varied
28. The letters appear in full 7 Ad. & E. at 317-19, 112 Eng. Rep. at 490-91;
Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 5 Cl. & Fin. at 673, 676, 678, 7 Eng. Rep. at 559,
561-62 (K.B. 1838); also 1 V.R. 20, 25, 35.
29. The array of counsel was also glittering. Pollock, on his way to and
after attaining knighthood, battled throughout to sustain the will; he had
associates perhaps less well remembered. In connection with the initial trial
at York in 1830, Brougham assailed the will; but he became Lord Chancellor
before this phase of the matter ended, and thus Sir James Scarlett and
Solicitor-General Home came to have a voice in argument; against the latter
Sir E. Sugden appeared but was not called upon. The Lord Chancellor most
properly in substance abstained from the ultimate appellate proceedings,
Lord Chief Justice Tindal and Lord Chief Baron Lyndhurst taking over.
Tatham v. Wright, 2 Russ. & M. 1, 4, 10, 12, 39 Eng. Rep. 295, 296, 298, 299
(K.B. 1831). Lord Brougham functioned in the concluding stage of the
controversy before the House of Lords, but his vote was not decisive. 5 Cl. &
Fin. 670, 768-69, 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 595. In connection with the first trial of
the ejectment before Baron Gurney at Lancaster, Sir James Scarlett attacked
the will. Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 1 Ad. & E. 4, 11, 14, 110 Eng. Rep. 1108,
1112, 1113 (Ex. 1834). In connection with the second and third trials at
Lancaster (the former again before Baron Gurney, the latter before Justice
Coleridge), Sir James Scarlett at first continued, but departed to be made
Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer in December, 1834, and Baron Abinger
early in 1835, with Cresswell and Starkie taking his place in the Marsden will
contest. The second of the two counsel last named, who had become Downing
Professor of the Laws of England in 1823, was an evidence expert, a new
edition of his text on that subject having come out in 1833. 7 Ad. & E. at 313,
322, 336, 343, 350, 112 Eng. Rep. at 488, 492, 500, 503 (1834, 1836, 1837). Before
the House of Lords, Cresswell and Starkie won the final victory. 5 Cl. & Fin.
at 670, 679, 683, 7 Eng. Rep. at 559, 562, 564 (1838).
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discussion much special urging to fabricate a new hearsay exception.
Argument of counsel and judges can on the whole be most easily
referred to as effort for and against restricting definition of the
exclusionary rule's scope.
But, on the other side, general conditions and particular problem
contained unfavorable legalistic elements. The 1830's, during which
the case was presented, fell in an era of somewhat pompous professional satisfaction as to the technical English rules of proof at common
law.30 Consider, for instance, that Mr. Justice Coleridge in the instant
litigation saw fit to decry before the House of Lords "the fallacy, that,
whatever is morally convincing, and whatever reasonable beings
would form their judgments and act upon, may be submitted to a
jury."3' Liberalized reception of evidence, by definition or otherwise,
was scarcely the order of the day.
30. Consider, for instance, the exhibition of extreme. technicalism in the
famous trial scene presented by WARREN, TEN THOUSAND A YEAR (1841) (the
timing of events narrated in this book is explicitly stated as contemporaneous
with Wright v. Tatham; the first chapter made its initial appearance in
Blackwood's Magazine for October, 1839, and the first full edition was dated
1841). It should be frankly admitted that the VERBATim REPORT of the second
ejectment trial in Wright v. Tatham contains no excruciating hairsplitting
about evidence; instead it shows a highly complicated matter moved ahead
with deliberate speed in the commendable sense; but the reader should
remember that the trial of the Chancery issues and the first ejectment trial
had already occurred; technicalism was worn pretty threadbare. The opinions
of Park, J., in the Exchequer Chamber on writ of error to the result of the
final 1836 trial, and in the House of Lords, urge liberal admissibility and
amusingly throw a quotation "from Mr. Starkie's invaluable work" back in
the face of the author himself as counsel for Admiral Tatham. 7 Ad. & E. at
395-401, 112 Eng. Rep. at 519-20; 5 Cl. & Fin. at 751-58, 7 Eng. Rep. at 589-91.
But as an author, the invaluable Mr. Starkie was favoring consideration of
a wide range of illuminating facts "provided they can be established by
competent means." See his and Cresswell's argument as summarized in 5
Cl. & Fin. at 683-84, 7 Eng. Rep. at 564. The textbook on evidence was talking
about relevancy, not playing ducks and drakes with any sacred technical rule
of legal proof. Nor did Park, J., differ with his brethren about the inadmissibility of the challenged letters apart from evidence of intelligent action
-upon them by Marsden. See note 38 infra.
31. 5 Cl. & Fin. at 690, 7 Eng. Rep. at 566. A remarkable fallacy, indeed,
particularly when associated, as it is throughout discussion in this early 19th
century case, with the proposition that in juryless ecclesiastical courts evidence more or less like that here considered might be safely received because
of the more sophisticated character of the triers of fact. E.g., Cresswell and
Starkie in argument-7 Ad. & E. at 346-47, 353-54, 112 Eng. Rep. at 501-02, 504;
Bosanquet, J.-7 Ad. & E. at 374-76, 112 Eng. Rep. at 511-12; Parke, B.-7 Ad.
& E. at 389, 112 Eng. Rep. at 517; Tindal, C. J.-7 Ad. & E. at 400-02, 112 Eng.
Rep. at 521-22; Coleridge, J.-5 Cl. & Fin. at 692, 7 Eng. Rep. at 567; Williams,
J.-5 Cl. & Fin. at 701-02, 7 Eng. Rep. at 570; Littledale, J.-5 Cl. & Fin. at
748-49, 7 Eng. Rep. at 588; Lord Brougham-5 Cl. & Fin. at 770-71, 7 Eng.
Rep. at 595. Are not jurors "reasonable beings"; and if they are, why deprive
them of a kind of evidential material, familiar to them from everyday use

in formation of judgments and decisions to act, because of fear that they will
not be mentally capable of appraising the material? And with specific
reference to this very case, be it remembered that at the one trial in which
the contested letters were admitted, and in which the will was sustained,
there was a special jury principally composed of tough-minded merchants.
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Also the particular issue was such as to demand that the content
of the letters, if they were admissible, be considered an implied
showing of their writers' opinion respecting Marsden's mental grasp
of the practical matters which must be comprehended for the making
of a valid will. Doubt was manifested as to whether unskilled witnesses on the stand would have been allowed to testify in words to
that kind of opinion, and inferences drawn from out-of-court, nonexplicit utterances were obviously deemed even less acceptable.3 2
When hearsay or something that looks like hearsay gets compounded
with opinion, its admissibility is doubly unlikely. Then, besides,
after a fashion which still prevails more in Great Britain than in
this country, there was no effective effort to produce common statements in the areas of agreement.
The ultimate upshot was a confused miscellany of opinions, doing
little to clarify the concept of hearsay or helpfully to free any broad
category of evidence from its shackles. And it must, with considerable
shame, be conceded that subsequent judicial analyses and pronouncements in the United States have not, on the whole, greatly advanced
comprehension of the evidentiary problems raised by the battle over
John Marsden's will. Even so, somewhat useful commentary is possible:
(1) In the Marsden will case, the three letters already mentioned
formed only a small fraction of the documentary evidence. Along
with them, seemingly in the same place of deposit, were found items
of a voluminous correspondence to and from Marsden running over
the years 1787-1820.3 Usability in evidence of this correspondence is
conceded throughout the discussion, because its content and the
attendant circumstances plainly allowed a reasonable finding that
See notes 22, 23 supra; also the summing up in 2 V.R. at 298: "most of you,

gentlemen, I believe, are engaged in manufactures, or in commerce."
In addition to Coleridge, J., it is worth quoting Vaughan, J., speaking of
extrajudicial acts manifesting even such opinions as are adverse to the
interests of the actors: "They are merely opinions expressed in different
language, in the language of conduct, instead of the language of words....
[A]s moral evidence, they may be very cogent. Yet does the law, more rigid
and inflexible, resist the weight of such moral evidence, although, in the

ordinary transactions of life, common sense and experience might possibly
yield to it." 5 C1. & Fin. at 739, 7 Eng. Rep. at 584. Is he proud of the law's
pig-headed conduct, or apologetic about it? Even if the latter, he deems himself powerless.
32. Coltman, J.-7 Ad. & E. at 359-60, 112 Eng. Rep. at 506; Bosanquet, J.7 Ad. & E. at 373, 112 Eng. Rep. at 511; Parke, B.-7 Ad. & E. at 388-89,
112 Eng. Rep. at 516-17; Coleridge, J.-5 Cl. & Fin. at 690-91, 7 Eng. Rep. at
566; Tindal, L.C.J.-5 Cl. & Fin. at 759-60, 7 Eng. Rep. at 592; also Cresswell
and Starkie in argument-5 Cl. & Fin. at 687, 7 Eng. Rep. at 565.
33. Tatham v. Wright, 2 Russ. & M. 1, 22-26, 39 Eng. Rep. 295, 303-04 (K.B.
1831) (issues framed in Chancery); Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 5 Cl. & Fin.
670, 707-08, 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 572-73 (1838) (Gurney, B.); also 1 V.R. 18.
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Marsden had during the give and take of reading, writing, and other
action manifested some business acumen and general intelligence. 4
Such employment of such evidence plainly removes from hearsay
classification the incoming letters addressed to Marsden. Their substance is presented only because it embodies the stimuli to be considered in determining whether Marsden's responses or other reactions
were those of a capable person or of a bungling idiot. Were the
judges equally correct, however, in their immediate tacit assumption
that Marsden's responsive behavior did not involve hearsay when
evidenced as tending to establish testamentary competency? Theanswer to this question should surely be affirmative. Appraisal of
the rationality of Marsden's reactions to these successive external
stimuli is self-probative with respect to intelligent perception or the
reverse. The stimuli were steadily before him to remove any necessary reliance upon powers of memory. Sincerity cuts no figure in the
evaluation. If incapable of sound judgment, he could hardly fabricate
an appearance of it; if capable of sound judgment, it did not matter
whether he acted without reflection or with conscious intention to
manifest his wisdom. Nothing like a risk of misinterpretation
threatens. Even in a single instance the whimsies of a fool are unlikely
by chance to match the behavior of a person having common sense;
such matching over a period of 33 years is inconceivable.35
(2) On return to the three seriously litigated letters, the risk of
insincerity was less confidently dismissed. Some of the opinions
assert that one writing a letter to an addressee whose intelligence he
deems defective may deliberately disguise that belief for any of a
number of reasons running all the way from affectionate consideration to contemptuous derision. 36 By and large, though, the opinions
state or imply a view that likelihood of such conscious duplicity in
the particular letters was inconsiderable, and indeed that no thought
of manifesting any belief as to Marsden's mental capacities occurred
to the writers.3 7 Even so, none of the judges who participated in the
34. Put succinctly by the Lord Chancellor (Baron Cottenham) at the end
of the litigation. 5 Cl. & Fin. at 773, 7 Eng. Rep. at 597 (letters admissible
for gauging intelligence of action thereon; inadmissible if uncoupled with
action).
35. Does this analysis square with proper analysis of testimony offered to
establish the degree of impairment of declarant's hearing, and consisting of
assertion (1) that with declarant blindfolded a tuning fork was vibrated at
varying distances from his ears and (2) that he stated with respect to each
step in the test that he could or could not hear the sound, these statements
building up into a consistent pattern of impairment? Edwards v. Druien, 235
Ky. 835, 837, 32 S.W.2d 411, 412 (1930).
36. Denman, L.C.J.-7 Ad. & E. at 326, 112 Eng. Rep. at 494; Bosanquet, J.7 Ad. & E. at 381, 112 Eng. Rep. at 514; Williams, J.-5 Cl. & Fin. at 700, 7
Eng. Rep. at 570; Littledale, J.-5 Cl. & Fin. at 746-47, 7 Eng. Rep. at 587.
37. The statement by Park, J., in 5 Cl. & Fin. at 754, 757, 7 Eng. Rep. at 590,
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final hearing of the case flatly committed himself to the proposition
that the three letters should have been admitted as falling outside
the hearsay area.38
(3) It is reasonable, then, to conclude that this massive old litigation supplies definite authority against any doctrine of escaping the
hearsay label solely by getting away from the kind of conscious
assertion which gives rise to a sincerity problem. Indeed, that great
judge Baron Parke was quite definite on the point:
But the question is, whether the contents of these letters are evidence
of the fact to be proved upon this issue,-that is, the actual existence of
the qualities which the testator is, in those letters, by implication, stated
to possess: and those letters may be considered in this respect to be on
the same footing as if they had contained a direct and positive statement
that he was competent. 39
While this sentence as it stands is an assertion of a result without
supporting reasons, those reasons can be gathered quite reliably from
other portions of the reports. In various forms of words it is insisted
that the assertion of a declarant-most particularly an assertion
respecting the mental capacity of another person-must for real
probative value be based upon adequate perception and appreciation
of relevant facts. 40 This fundamental need remains even when a
process of inference replaces forthright assertion. Removal of risk
of insincerity does not at all cure a deficit of information. Crossexamination becomes on many occasions very useful to test possible
existence of such a deficit. This is perfectly intelligible, and has
plenty of reasonable appeal at large and in the abstract.
But common law does not shape its principles through abstract
processes. It shapes them by continuous integration of perfectly concrete cases. The concrete situation as to the testator's mental competency in the Marsden case, from the plaintiff Admiral's point of
view, involved intellectual inferiority then described as "connate
imbecility" present from youth, easily recognizable through symptoms
manifest to anybody, and not improved by advancing age.41 Each
591, is vigorous; that by Parke, B., in 7 Ad. & E. at 384, 112 Eng. Rep. at 515,
less emphatic. Gurney, B., hammered this matter hard in 2 V.R. 320-21, 338.
See also Sir F. Pollock in argument. 7 Ad. & E. at 341, 358, 112 Eng. Rep. at
499, 506.
38. So stated by Lord Chancellor Cottenham in 5 Cl. & Fin. at 773, 7 Eng.
Rep. at 597.
39. 7 Ad. &E. at 385, 388-89, 112 Eng. Rep. at 515, 516-17.
40. Starkie and Cresswell in argument-7 Ad. & E. at 351-52, 112 Eng. Rep.
at 503, 5 Cl. & Fin. at 684-87, 7 Eng. Rep. 564-65; and see Sir F. Pollock7 Ad. & E. at 349, 112 Eng. Rep. at 502; Coltman, J.-7 Ad. & E. at 361-62,
112 Eng. Rep. at 506; Bosanquet, J.-7 Ad. & E. at 373, 112 Eng. Rep. at 511;
Williams, J.-5 Cl. & Fin. at 700, 7 Eng. Rep. at 569-70; Patteson, J.-5 Cl.
& Fin. at 719-20, 7 Eng. Rep. at 575; Littledale, J.-5 Cl. & Fin. at 746-47,
7 Eng. Rep. at 587.
41. Testimony of Dr. Ambrose Cookson. 1 V.R. 360 passim.
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writer of the letters challenged as constituting inadmissible hearsay
was .well acquainted with Marsden; the first as one of his nearest
relatives and an associate, incidentally having when he wrote precisely the same interests in Marsden's property as the writer's brother
Admiral Tatham, the ultimate heir-at-law; the other two writers as
clergymen living and carrying on their duties in the vicinity of
Marsden's home.4 There is no possible doubt that all had plentiful
opportunity to observe those personal qualities in Marsden which
43
were relevant to the issue, or that effective observation did occur.
Successful objection to the specific evidence for risk of inadequate
perception is absurd unless the reality of the actual situation is to be
remorselessly sacrificed to an inapplicable generality-certainly an
evil paradox in the search for truth. And, at this point, it may be
illuminating to consider two other paradoxes.
(4) How was it that judges dealing so solemnly with a single
testimonial risk in the litigated letters were pleasantly acquiescent
with respect to other rather rowdy evidence in the same case which
exhibited not only this risk but also and glaringly the fundamental
risk of insincerity? The reference of course is to the testimony that
people contemptuously called the testator "Silly Jack" and "Silly
Marsden," and that young rapscallions shouted "There goes crazy
Marsden" and threw dirt at him.4 Here is blatant intentional assertion, reeking with doubt as to adequate basis of observation, and also
reeking with the possibility of cruel immature distortion of truth.
If the attitude thus taken without discussion in the Marsden will controversy is traceable to a vague extension of the principle admitting
45
evidence of local reputation as bearing upon character, there surely
42. 1 V.R. 35-36, 2 id. 247-51, 320-21, 338; Gurney, B., 7 Ad. & E. at 367-71,

112 Eng. Rep. at 509-10; Bolland, B.-5 Cl. & Fin. at 731, 7 Eng. Rep. at 581-82

(this judge was in a curiously embarrassing position; he had twice testified
in support of the will's validity-e.g., 1 V.R. 205-08-having once stayed in
Marsden's home as a guest for 33 days).
43. If the description of Marsden's mental deficiency stated in connection
with note 41 supra is accepted as correct, the remote dates of the three letters
had no substantial bearing upon cogency. Marsden's condition was life-long
and its symptoms were so broadly obvious as to lay no tax on the observers'
memory. It is true that Park, J., when dealing with the probative worth of
the letters used the expression "feather in the scales of justice" and said that
it was scarcely "worth while to insist" upon either admission or rejection of
them as evidence. 7 Ad. & E. at 399, 112 Eng. Rep. at 520; 5 Cl. & Fin. at 753
7 Eng. Rep. at 589. Tindal, C. J., also talked them down. 7 Ad. & E. at 408, 112
Eng. Rep. at 523. But these particular letters were not put in evidence during
the trial before Park, J., Gurney, B., vigorously played up their importance
in the trial before him where they were admitted, and the will was sustained
in that trial. See 2 V.R. 320-21, 338; also Pollock at 247-51.
44. See p. 751 supra.
45. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1608-21 (3d ed. 1940); In re Wah-kon-tahhe-um-pah's Estate: He-to-op-pe v. Hanna, 109 Okla. 126, 132, 234 Pac. 210,

216 (1925) ("old crazy woman"); In re Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 68, 132
Atl. 786, 790 (1926) ("normal talk about people who live a secluded life").
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results a questionable choice, so far as probative merit is concerned,
between the dignified evidence of the letters and the unbridled evidence of juvenile uproar. It is only fair to add (a) that the rapscallion
evidence never was discussed at top level and (b) that there is more
recent authority against admissibility. 46
(5) More pointedly, suppose that the heir-at-law attacking Mars47
den's will had been the cousin who wrote the 1784 litigated letter,
instead of that cousin's brother Admiral Tatham. Is there any reasonable doubt that the letter, with its inference of sanity and testamentary
validity, would have been received in favor of the devisees and
against the heir-at-law? 48 The pervasive doctrine of admissions
would surely now-and in all likelihood then-propel the writing
past any hearsay objection. This, of course, is in some sense a bit
of by-play. But it is by-play with a really serious purpose. The
meticulous solemnity attendant upon enforcement of the hearsay
rule in its more refined aspects seems decidedly ridiculous while we
permit the admission, mimicking mischievous Till Eulenspiegel, so
freely to pop through, over, and under the sacrosanct barrier.
(6) Risk of defective memory was mentioned often enough during
the taking of testimony about the Marsden will,49 but scarcely if at
all in connection with use of the three letters on which the present
discussion makes its focus. Speaking again in generalities, this seems
an important neglect. With respect to disclosure and repair of defects
of memory, there is a huge distinction between handling witnesses
formally put on the stand and handling a declarant who makes an
extrajudicial statement.
The prospective witness knows ahead of time he will be put under
oath and subjected to various severe sanctions. Hence in the interests of making a respectable showing and avoiding penalties he will
46. In re Hine, 68 Conn. 551, 557, 37 Atl. 384, 386-87 (1897).
47. Or, for that matter, somebody claiming through the writer's cousin after
the latter's death.
48. Even as matters actually stood, there was some attempt to charge the
Admiral with the written implication of his dead brother's views. 2 V.R.
247-51, 338.
49. Perhaps the most vivid illustration is an expression of marked skepticism by Gurney, J., as to the ability of a farmer's son and a laborer to
remember after 38 years the particulars of a trifling game of cards. 2 V.R.
320-21, with other illustrations appended. Starkie, in argument, seems to
stress risks of uncertain memory. 5 Cl. & Fin. at 684-87, 7 Eng. Rep. at 564-65.
In a recent notorious English criminal case defense counsel skillfully developed the peril of forgetfulness by witnesses who were only slightly if at all
infected by a tendency toward insincerity (at least in the early stages of
their testimony) and quite certainly had carefully perceived the matters in
question when those matters occurred. BEDFORD, THE TRIAL OF DR. ADAMS, 19,
194, 199, 224 (1959) (alleged slow murder of patient by physician; nurses'
testimony as to custody of drugs and variety and quantity of dosage checked
to considerable extent against their own contemporaneous records, the veracity
of which had strong testimonial and circumstantial support).
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feel pressure to achieve full recall of accurate memory.50 If the case
is well prepared, counsel will question him in advance and do all they
can to arouse responsible recollection. 5 ' In addition to, or in default
of, these preparatory steps, trial lawyers have worked out an effective
52
technique for stimulating memory during interrogation.
In lamentable contrast, the great majority of hearsay utterances
sought to be proved have not thus been carefully checked and bolstered.5 3 Their latent weaknesses, which often would be easily
accessible by properly directed cross-examination, are only fitfully
disclosed.5 4
But again it is essential to abandon general talk for specific scrutiny.
Having in mind the broad and obvious symptoms bearing upon the
kind of intellectual weakness attributed to the testator Marsden,
there was slight risk that passage of time would have destroyed or
even substantially blurred in the minds of the letter writers the
memory of those observations relevant to validity of the will. Thus
there was sound common sense in declining to harp upon the memory
factor, which could not under the actual circumstances have contributed any substantial justification for exclusion of the letters.
(7) A final comment is called for with respect to risk of misinterpretation.55 This, as has been said, is not very threatening under most
circumstances where evidence is offered to prove ordinary verbal
declarations.6 With substitution of inferences for assertions, though,
real interpretative difficulties often arise. Here, however, the TathamMarsden will case gives but little aid because on the whole the lawyers
and judges who dealt with it considered that the three embattled
letters should be treated as conveying, intentionally or uninten50. This stimulating pressure fell far short of meeting the needs of, the
situation in the Bedford case mentioned by the last sentence of the preceding
note. What the nurses really needed was full access to their contemporaneous
records in preparing to testify. See the reference given by note 9 supra. But
they had no knowledge that the records had been preserved.
51. This of course has a useful bearing upon lucidity of narration.
52. See again the reference given by note 9 supra.
53. There are exceptions. E.g., depositions in perpetuam memoriam, which
may well enough be deemed hearsay evidence if sought to be used against
persons not duly notified of their taking. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1378(1) (3d
ed. 1940). Then, too, a witness unavailable at trial may have been put with
honest care through a complete informal quizzing at the hands of counsel or
the police. But the transcript of such testimonial evidence is regarded with
holy horror. See the shocked alarm of Mr. Justice Douglas in Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943), that "any law office in the land" might
embody witness statements in receivable business entries. It is hard to win
belief in the honor of the legal profession.
54. Cross-examination may be highly effective in uncovering shortcomings
of memory as well as of perception. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, 62 HARv. L.
REV. 177, 188 (1948).
55. Cf. consideration of juvenile testimonial weaknesses on pp. 743-44 supra.
56. See pp. 748-49 supra.
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tionally, honesty or deceitfully, a view that the addressee had the
rather modest degree of knowledge and judgment required for testamentary competency. Hence, for enlargement, this comment is carried over to the next part of the discussion.

III.

HEARSAY DEFINITION:

MODERN CASES

AND PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION
A. Ambiguity of Inference
Probably the stock case of ambiguous human behavior at or beyond
the outer edge of the hearsay area involves something in the nature
of flight after occurrence of a crime, sought to be proved as justifying
an inference that the person who fled was solely to blame and
offered on behalf of another person accused of guilt.5 7 Such evidence
raises some risk on the score of sincerity, which will be taken up
after the present problem of proper interpretation has been treated.
What the trier of facts is invited to seek in the immediate connection
must of course be the motive for flight-whether sense of guilt as to
some other matter, pure panic, urgent need to escape interference
with performance of some essential and innocent task, or any of
innumerable other reasons within the realm of possibility. The
ambiguity of inference raises a problem definitely analogous to that
of properly interpreting obscure or equivocal testimonial language.8
It brings into play a considerable though scattered body of case law
demanding that the desired conclusion-here, as stated, with respect
to motive-be either "a natural or plausible one among the various
conceivable ones" or, more stringently, the "more (most?) plausible
or more (most?) natural out of the various ones that are conceivable."59
57. It scarcely needs statement that evidence of such flight when offered

against the fleeing person himself may be used as an implied admission.
Tasco v. State, 165 A.2d 456 (Md. 1960), discusses the cogency of this sort of
admission.
58. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 187-88, 197-99 (1948),

deals with the matter of interpreting testimonial and other language; here it
can usually be assumed that the declarant means to assert some proposition
of fact, and thus is quite surely caught in the hearsay net. In Alabama there
has been a substantial series of flight cases. Several throw up their hands
over the interpretative difficulty and exclude the evidence. Owensby v.
State, 82 Ala. 63, 64-65, 2 So. 764, 765 (1886); Levison v. State, 54 Ala. 520,
523, 527 (1875); Smith v. State, 9 Ala. 990, 995-96 (1846) (dicta, since matter
at issue was assertedly self-incriminating statements by a person other than
defendant). See additional Alabama citations in note 61 infra.
59. The wording quoted in the text is from 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 32, 38
(3d ed. 1940). Modern cases, not overwhelmingly numerous, incline toward
the more stringent of Wigmore's two formulae. Brennan v. State, 151 Md.
265, 268-69, 134 Atl. 148, 149-50, 48 A.L.R. 342, 345 (1926) (bastardy; sending baby carriage to home of expectant mother, where another child had
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This instantly suggests a problem of apportioning functions between
judge and jury. Assume a jurisdiction employing the second testthat it, "more plausible or more natural." Imagine next in that
jurisdiction a criminal trial containing evidence that X was present
at the scene and instant of a crime. The defendant D calls a witness
to testify that, immediately after occurrence of the crime, X ran
away and nobody can now find him. The prosecutor P objects to
admission of this testimony, suggesting that X has been suspected
of a whole string of other crimes on which he cannot bear police
inquiry. Should the trial judge require D, as a prerequisite to admission of the testimony, to convince him that X's more likely motive
for disappearance was a sense of guilt of the instant crime? 60 Or
should the judge go only so far as to demand that D, by following
through his original offer, plus perhaps further corroborative detail, 61
build up sufficient strength of inference so that the jurors might
reasonably find his proposed conclusion as to X's motive not only
acceptable, but more acceptable than P's opposing conclusion? Upon
general principles, the second formula just offered is correct. P's
objection is made on the ground of irrelevancy,6 2 and standard treatrecently been born); Milch v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 167 N.E.2d 845, 847
(Mass. 1960) (mere guess or conjecture of expert with basic facts pointing
no more toward his conclusion than the contrary); Standafer v. First Nat'l
Bank of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 123, 125-26, 52 N.W.2d 718, 720 (1952) (no

preponderating inference that heel of shoe torn off by catching in angle iron

rather than by striking during fatal fall of wearer); Pipes v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 338 S.W.2d 30, 36-39 (Mo. 1960) (issue as to whether locomotive
headlight illuminated; rejection of plaintiff's negative contention with talk of
equally reasonable inferences); Rickertsen v. Carskadon, 169 Neb. 744, 749,
100 N.W.2d 852, 856 (1960) (rule stated in general terms allowing admission

of remotely relevant evidence); Engel v. Union Traction Co., 203 N.Y. 321,
323-24, 96 N.E. 731-32, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 859 (1911) (discharge of motorman

a considerable time after accident not probative of his negligence; too many
other equally or more likely causes for discharge); Jones v. Douglas Aircraft
Co., 251 N.C. 832, 836-37, 112 S.E.2d 257, 260-61 (1960) (wrongful death of

crane operator by electrocution; evidence that assistant foreman responsible
for safeguarding area had been stricken and taken to hospital soon after

learning of accident; cause of hospitalization wholly speculative, and if treated
as admission of negligence not receivable against assistant foreman's principal); Toler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 778-80, 51 S.E.2d 210, 211-13
(1949) (theft of money; same sum and denominations found on defendant;

more natural and probable test satisfied on all facts).
60. Even without the competing inference which P suggests, the judge might
consider the showing too weak to uphold D's contention that X rather than
he was the proper culprit. See note 57 supra; see also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 303 (1942), and UNIoFRM RULE OF EVIDENCE 45.

61. Some indications of effective corroborative detail appear in: Lowrey v.
State, 26 Ala. App. 159, 161, 155 So. 313, 315 (1934); Davis v. State, 8 Ala. App.
211, 213, 62 So. 382, 383 (1913); Deloach v. State, 151 Miss. 85, 90-91, 117 So.
361, 362 (1928). Ward v. State, 15 Ala. App. 174, 72 So. 754 (1916), talks
about "part of the res gestae" in a way which may imply that brigading of
flight evidence with corroborative evidence can make applicable a hearsay
exception. See also the suicide cases in note 85 infra.
62. Situations may be imagined in which either of two, or even any of
several, competing conclusions would be relevant. E.g., vary the hypothetical

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

ment of objections so grounded is to let the jury resolve the doubt if
a reasonable decision might be made either way.63 There is much
simple common sense to this treatment. Disputes about relevancy
tend to feed into ultimate issues of the case instead of diverging into
the confused technical by-paths often pursued by disputes about
evidential competency.6 4
Everybody, also, must constantly exercise his wits in determinations
as to intelligibility and proper interpretation of human actions. More
often than not, we all manage this sort of problem quite well when
action takes the form of declaratory speech or writing. 65 While its
handling much more frequently demands conscious deliberation when
the problem is presented by choice of inferences which spring unintended from non-verbal human behavior, results in that connection
may be of even superior reliability, since here we can escape such
confusion as resides in individualized vocabularies and foreign
tongues. Manifestation through gesture, whether calculated or not,
is a kind of linguafranca.
By and large, then, the area under discussion does not demand
specialized intelligence or learning, and may properly be left to the
mine run of jurors.66 This line of reasoning plays down as a cause
for exclusion the purely communicative factor of weakness in all
testimonial evidence. In the immediate connection, it means that
doubt-even quite serious doubt-as to the propriety of inferring
from non-assertive human conduct a certain motive, or some other
case of the text by assuming X to have been an old and firm friend of D;
if D committed the crime, X saw him do it; X may have taken to concealment
because he did not wish to testify against his long-time friend. Objection by
P now becomes somewhat less likely; the episode may turn into grist for his
mill. This variation of hypothesis is also likely to suggest that X's flight may
have been dumb-show acting to divert suspicion from D. As to that angle of
possibilities, see p. 766 infra.
63. This touches upon a group of problems much explored of late years,
but still far from solved. A convenient general reference is FRYER, SELECTED

WmrNGs ON THE LAw OF EVIDEN E AND TRIAL 124 (1957).
64. Contrary to the views of Coleridge and Vaughan, JJ., quoted above at
p. 753 and in note 31, current tendencies are more and more toward apologizing for every departure from the liberal principle that relevancy and substantiality when combined make a ticket of admissibility for evidence. Cf.
note 105 infra.
65. In dealing with such manifestations from the point of view of hearsay,
little is likely to be said respecting doubtfulness of interpretation; the
damning quality is quite certain to be dubious sincerity.
66. This is not meant as a license to run wild. Considerations embodied in
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 303 (1942), and UNIFORm RULE or EVIDENCE
45, must receive judicial enforcement. Cf. related problems in connection
with witnesses offered at trial. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 495 n. 1 (insanity),
506 n. 3 (infancy) (3d ed. 1940); also material collected in MORGAN, MAGuIRE
& WEINSTEI, EVIDENCE 191-97 (4th ed. 1957). While the cases regularly mention ability to communicate as a necessary characteristic in witnesses, the
general impression conveyed is that only extreme deficiency in this respect
should disqualify.
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relevant meaning,67 ceases to be an uncompromising stone-wall barrier to admissibility.68
B. Adequate Perception

A familiar and commendable feature of our scheme for testimonial
evidence is the broad requirement that a witness must have personally
perceived the events or conditions to which he testifies. He may
not assume or guess. Usually he may not testify second-hand on the
basis of recitals by others who did perceive what happened or existed
-this obviously puts in colloquial form the essence of the rule
against hearsay. The same holds true, of course, for declarants who
do not take the stand, as was asserted and reasserted in the course
of the Marsden will case.6 9
These assertions have already been criticized as irrelevant, because
circumstances made clear beyond reasonable doubt that the three
declarants whose letters were discussed did have the requisite personal perception." But litigated situations constantly arise which
are not nearly so clear on this point, and for such situations provision
probably must be made in any acceptable redefinition of hearsay.
Treatment of the factor of perception is largely inferential in the
71
hearsay provisions of the Model Code and the Uniform Rules,
which may very well be read as calling for exclusion on this ground
only if the trial judge finds that no trier of fact could reasonably
believe that the declarant had perceived the matter which is the
subject of the declaration.7 Such a reading results from carrying
over into the rules about hearsay the criterion respecting personal
67. E.g., inaction as tending to prove that a bill or notice was not received,

or a sensation was not experienced. Falknor, Silence, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 192
(1940), approaches this sort of evidence with experienced caution. Silver v.

New York Cent. R.R., 329 Mass. 14, 19-21, 105 N.E.2d 923, 925-27 (1952), as to

which see note 77 infra, also exercises caution.
68. The stone wall changes to a more flexible obstacle even though the
judge, not the jury, be required to make the finding as to 'more plausible
or more natural."
69. This point is rarely emphasized in discussion of the hearsay rule at
large, because not even the most unquestionable personal perception would
suffice to boost the general run of verbal extrajudicial declarations over the
exclusionary barrier; but the importance of direct perception by declarants
is clear with respect to most hearsay exceptions.
70. See pp. 756-57 supra.
71. It should be remembered that both these proposals make express
assertion the essential primary badge of hearsay, thus emphasizing the factor
of sincerity and, in statement at least, minimizing the factors of perception
and memory. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 501, 502 (1942); UNIFORM RULES
or EVIDENCE 62, 63, the latter giving somewhat greater mention of the perception factor.
72. This is the form of words indicated by the Model Code, rules 104, 501;
special attention should be paid to subdivision (3) of the latter rule and the
last paragraph of Comment a thereon (cf. Illustration 3 under rule 501). The
corresponding portions of the Uniform Rules are Rules 19, 62, and 63 (opening
clause), where the subject matter is somewhat rearranged.
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perception provided for testimony from a witness on the stand. It

probably presents too lax a standard for the immediate purpose.
Since hearsay on the whole is an inferior vehicle of communication,
persuasive argument can be offered for affirmative proof or perception
by persons whose behavior gives rise to the sort of problem here
considered. Also, with the purpose of protecting jurors from the misleading potentialities of purely conjectural evidence, interlocutory
findings by the trial judge may properly be prerequisites for admission. It seems sufficiently cautious, however, to require normally
only a judicial finding-embodied, if practicable, in pretrial proceedings73 -that the individual with respect to whose behavior evidence
is offered had adequate opportunity for personal perception of the
matters which the behavior tends to establish as having occurred
or existed.74 Up to this point, the burden of preliminary proof will
naturally be on the proponent of the evidence. At some stage, though,
his primary obligation should end. If, for instance, the objecting
party challenges the normal consequences of opportunity by asserting neglect to observe or lack of qualification to observe understandingly, it is suggested that the burden at least of going forward with
the unusual new issue can properly fall on the objector.
C. Adequate Memory
The factor of memory easily links up with that of personal perception. Fairly often in the present connection it presents no more than
negligible difficulty. This seemed to be true with respect to the three
letters from John Marsden's correspondents.75 The same view holds
in the familiar cases of prosecution for illegal gambling and the like,
where police raiders testify to the content of incoming telephone calls
proposing wagers, and this is deemed proper evidence to establish
violation of the gaming laws.76 In a habitual gambler, memory is
73. It is desirable that parties litigant should know in advance what evidence will be acceptable.
74. The rigor of this requirement naturally varies with the nature of the
facts sought to be established. McCormick, Borderland, 39 YALE L.J. 489,
497 (1930). If the fact is a generalized condition, obvious and brief (e.g.,
undue chilliness in a railroad car-the Silver case in note 67 supra), or extending consistently over a protracted period, such as the mental deficiency
of John Marsden, adequate opportunity is easily demonstrable. If in contrast
there is put at issue a detailed complex of specific and varying facts involving action by several people, as in the treatment of Dr. Adams' patient during
her last long illness (note 49 supra), the preliminary showing of adequate
opportunity may become much more exacting.
75. See pp. 758-59 supra.
76. On this matter there is a considerable body of case law, quite con-

sistent in result but not always in reasoning. Contrast, for instance, the
logic of Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578, 591-92 (Fla. 1958), together with
State v. Tolisano, 136 Conn. 210, 213-15, 70 A.2d 118, 119-20, 13 A.L.R.2d
1405, 1408-09 (1949), which the first case cites, as against that of State v.
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highly reliable and constantly refreshed as to the places where and
telephone numbers through which he can risk his money. So, too, in
the typical flight-and-concealment-after-crime case; granting adequate
initial perception of the occurrence, memory is unlikely to fail. Still
more emphatically, where it was sought to prove by evidence of lack
of complaint from passengers in a Pullman car that the car was not
allowed to become unduly cold, no memory problem whatever existed;
the indicative behavior exactly synchronized with sensation. 7
But in a multitude of situations, including such matters as the
witness-statements which the nurses of Dr. Adams' dying patient
gave the prosecution long after the events had taken place, 78 memory
offers a really serious potential weakness tending to undermine the
validity of inferences as well as that of explicit declarations. 9 The
appropriate definitional safeguard naturally parallels that suggested
above with respect to perception, and form of wording may be derived
from Model Code and Uniform Rules. 80
D. Sincerity
Throughout the preceding discussion runs a tacit concession that
any evidence of extrajudicial human action or inaction offered for a
purpose necessitating reliance upon the sincerity of the particular
human being must be classified as hearsay. The foregoing statement
is of course an alternative way of wording the familiar "offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated" 81 formula. No difficulty exists
in recognition of particular instances fitting the exclusionary formula
so long as the manifestation takes the form of ordinary verbal assertion. More or less difficulty does result whenever the immediate
significance of the manifestation, verbal or otherwise, must be got
at by inference. The question is, of course, whether the author of the
Domino, 234 La. 950, 959, 102 So. 2d 227, 230 (1958). Adequate memory on the
part of the would-be bettors is cheerfully taken for granted. Cf. 767
infra.
77. This is the Silver case, cited in note 67 supra. The informed reader
will observe the interesting relationship of this problem to the hearsay
exception for declarations of concurrent physical sensation.
78. As already remarked in note 50, the nurses who testified in this trial
had before taking the stand no access to their records currently made while
they were on the case, and on cross-examination these records proved disconcerting. The illustration is not chosen because such statements as the
text assumes were actually sought to be used as evidence during the trial,
but rather because of trial lawyers' necessary habitual reliance upon this
kind of delayed record of previous perceptions.
79. See p. 749 supra.
80. Treatment in both the Model Code and the Uniform Rules is as an
exception to the hearsay rule rather than as part of its definition. MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 504 (1942); UNIFomVu
RuLE OF EVIDENCE 63(4) (c)
(1953).
81. UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE

63 (1953);

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules

501, 502 (1942), put the same proposition in a systematic but more diffuse way.
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manifestation intended the inference to be drawn.8 2
It seems to the present writer that too little attention has here been
paid to the problem of burden of proof. Assuming as the sound broad
principle that relevant evidence is acceptable unless barred by some
technical rule of incompetency or privilege, the proper normal course
must be to put on objecting parties the burden of establishing, in
debatable cases, the intention stated by the last sentence of the preceding paragraph. To return to the stock example: Defendant D,
prosecuted for a crime obviously committed by only one person,
asserts innocence and offers evidence that X, on hand at the right
place and time to be guilty, fled and hid after the crime. The prosecutor P objects to this evidence, claiming that X was intentionally
seeking by his action to attach suspicion and pursuit to himself. The
83
prosecutor should have the burden of establishing that claim.
But it is far from clear that actual court practice embodies this
procedural rule. Unreasoned talk of parallelism between such evasive4
behavior and an outright confession by the absentee can be found.8
Fear is implied that admission of evidence of another's flight would
encourage falsely trumped up semblances of guilt. Only in quite
extreme instances has this or comparable evidence been given any85
thing like a cordial reception.
Some rather obvious considerations cast doubt on this restrictive

attitude. To begin with, while the flight-after-crime situation has
been featured for illustrative purposes, it or analogous situations are
not likely to be those ordinarily encountered. Most easily conceivable
82. The text may impose too rigorous a test. How if the manifestation
implies an unuttered determination of fact or opinion? See Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers,62 HARv. L. Rxv. 177, 214, 215 (1948), and p. 772 infra. The point is
tantalizingly debatable. For specific illustrations, each requiring scrutiny to
determine on which side of the line it falls, see id. at 190-91; McCormick,
Borderland,39 YAx L.J. 489, 495 n. 17 (1930); Falknor, Silence, 89 U. PA. L.
Rav. 192, 196 n. 15 (1940).
83. Of course other grounds for the objection, notably feebleness or
ambiguity of inference (see note 60 supra), are often available and exploited.
84. McCormick, Borderland,39 YALE L.J. 489, 494 nn. 14, 15 (1930); Falknor,
Silence, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 195 n. 13 (1940).
85. People v. Dewachter, 353 IlL. 266, 269-70, 187 N.E. 472, 474 (1933)

(embezzlement; trial judge excluded evidence that documents seemingly
hidden to conceal the embezzlement were found in safe deposit box of another
person who had committed suicide when discovery of crime threatened, this
person being $10,000 short in his accounts; reversed; the evidence had a very
clear bearing upon the issue involved); Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 272,
134 Atl. 148, 151, 48 A.L.R. 342, 347 (1926) (bastardy; suicide of another man,
married and on terms of friendship with mother's family, after being
informed of child's birth; suicide a "spontaneous and uninfluenced act," which
majority use to justify introduction of evidence of declarations of culpability
made by the dead man). Cf. Jones v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 251 N.C. 832, 83637, 112 S.E.2d 257, 260-61 (1960), talking in terms of ambiguity of inference
and hearsay about evidence of sudden illness of responsible assistant foreman
soon after learning that fatal accident had occurred; here the problem was
liability of assistant foreman's employer.
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sets of fact raising the issue as to whether non-verbal behavior was
staged with deliberate intent to convey assertive propositions by
dumb show lack the complication of possible underworld deceptive
practice. Even where underworld risks lurk, why should it be hopelessly assumed that ability of opposing counsel and common sense
perceptiveness of jurors will lack adequate power to expose and
appraise them? Getting full information to the triers of fact usually
has value outweighing rather remote chances of their being hoodwinked.
Another observation seems pertinent. Absolutism in applying the
hearsay rule has been unduly encouraged by the double assumption
that all hearsay is somehow very bad-vide Coleridge and Vaughan
as quoted above8-and that the hearsay label can be applied with
easy, confident assurance. The second half of the assumption has
tended to deprive trial judges of preliminary fact-finding authority
in determining whether hearsay actually does confront them. In
plenty of familiar situations they ought to have such authority, and
should exercise it on the basis of practical likelihoods.
The police officer told to take incoming telephone calls in the course
of a raid on a suspected gambling joint hears coming in over the
wires a dozen instructions, employing appropriate betting jargon, to
place wagers on this, that, or another quadruped. He thinks he is
collecting good non-hearsay evidence, and so fortunately do the
courts. But it is conceivable that the voices he heard were those of
twelve Sunday school superintendents, informed of the raid and
consciously seeking to express the proposition: "This telephone is
regularly used for gambling purposes." In fact, of course, the odds
are ten thousand to one that the telephone speakers had no intention
whatever of expressing any such thing, but only a desire to give
betting instructions. The courts have quite properly refused the
short end of the wager,87 and iii other cases as well where there is
a more even balance between assertion and non-assertion trial judges'
should become accustomed to making determinations of preliminaryfact bearing upon admissibility.
E. Statements Validated by Later Opportunity
To Cross-Examine
A final item contributing to the proper definition of hearsay is the
relevant verbal assertion made*extrajudicially by an individual physically present and available for cross-examination at trialP The princi86. P. 753 and note 31 supra.
87. Note 76 supra.
88. The most common and tempting illustration is the pretrial witness
statement, now commonly used to impeach a wayward witness and under

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

pal problem as to admissibility of this item, so far as the hearsay rule
is concerned, arises only because opportunity to cross-examine is not
concurrent with the making of the assertion.P The Model Code carries careful but brief argument in favor of admissibility; the Uniform
Rules summarily dismiss objections ° Both, however, treat the item
as constituting an exception to the exclusionary rule. A bolder course
is here proposed. Such evidence satisfies the requirements of the
hearsay rule. Hence a comprehensive definition should cover its
competency.
F. ProposedDefinition
The introductory portion of this paper spoke near its conclusion of
a functioning definition of hearsay. That terminology needs explanation. It means the kind of definition which (1) states criteria and
(2) indicates procedure for their application. Part (2) puts teeth in
part (1). This is essential to any working definition embodying a
requirement of incidental determinations of litigable fact for ascertaining whether the definition is applicable. A fundamental element
of the thesis here presented is that such determinations are demanded
not only for utilization of exceptions to the hearsay rule but for
determining the coverage of the rule itself.
The following definition with operating directions is intended as a
chopping block and nothing more. It takes a team of workers to make
a proper definition. Since the processes of common law development
are extremely unlikely to produce any such elaborate directional
text,91 the form chosen is that of a court rule. This form can easily
be turned into that of one or more statutory sections.
special circumstances to rehabilitate a witness attacked on the ground of
recent invention, this latter employment sometimes being treated as allowable in the guise of a hearsay exception. Burns v. Clayton, 117 S.E.2d 300,
310 (S.C. 1960), characterizes the employment as falling under a hearsay
exception; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 394 Pa. 588, 601-05, 148 A.2d 234, 24143 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 844 (1959), carefully circumscribes application of the evidence to avoid hearsay use. Cf. note 53 supra.
89. Such criticisms as that written pretrial statements may have undue
influence when set against purely oral testimony have nothing to do with
hearsay.
90. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503(b) (1942), and Comment; UNIFORM
RuLE or EVIDENCE 63(1) and Comment: "When sentiment is laid aside there
is little basis for objection . . : ." See United States v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d

386 (8th Cir. 1960), for full discussion of the present conventional attitude.
91. Thoroughly implemented practice opinions like United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949) (revival
and recordation of memory), are rare as hens' teeth, and even here Kalodner,
Cir. J., did not reduce his directions to compact, thumbnail form. The writer
feels bound to admit that his own functioning definition is overwordy and
filthily technical, but fears that only precise guidance can lead to escape
from the present hearsay entanglement. A persistently operating movement
toward working simplification might make possible in time the substitution
of far less repulsive phrasing.
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RULE-Hearsay Evidence in General. Hearsay evidence is defined, and its exclusion and admission shall be enforced, as follows:
(a) Evidence tending to prove a statement of a version of a
matter made otherwise than (1) by a witness either while giving
testimony at the trial or other hearing during which the question
of admissibility is raised, or in the form of a deposition there
receivable as equivalent to testimony so given, or (2) by a person
present at such trial or hearing and available for cross examination
with respect to the statement and the matter, is hearsay evidence
so far as offered to prove the truth of the version.
(b) Evidence of conduct (behavior) by any person, although not
constituting a statement of the version of a matter it is offered to
prove, is hearsay evidence if so offered as to call for reliance upon
untested perception or memory by such person. Such reliance is
not called for if the judge finds that the conduct (behavior) occurred
(1) when the person was currently preceiving the matter, or when
he had recently perceived the matter and while his recollection of
it was clear, or (2) under such circumstances that the person was
subject to the sanctions of cross examination with respect to the
conduct (behavior) and the matter. A finding by the judge that the
person had adequate opportunity to perceive the matter shall raise
a presumption that he did adequately perceive it.
(c) No other evidence than that described as hearsay evidence
in parts (a) and (b) of this rule shall be treated as hearsay evidence.
(d) Hearsay evidence shall
tion so far as the judge does
ments of an exception to the
nent of the evidence having
such satisfaction.

be subject to exclusion on due objecnot find that it satisfies the requireexclusionary hearsay rule, the propothe burden of proof with respect to

(e) As used in this rule(1) "Statement" means, with respect to a version of a matter
included therein, any intentional manifestation of that version,
whether or not then communicated to any other person, made
either (i) verbally or (ii) by non-verbal conduct (behavior) substituted for words. The judge shall determine whether non-verbal
conduct (behavior) is an intentional manifestation, the objecting
party having the burden of proof.
(2) "Perceive" means to acquire knowledge through one's
senses.
(3) "Conduct" ("Behavior") includes both action and inaction.
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(f) When evidence of conduct (behavior), not otherwise subject
to objection and exclusion under part (d) of this rule, will be
relevant to the issues only if a certain inference or certain inferences shall be drawn therefrom, the judge shall not exclude the
evidence as irrelevant if he finds that a sufficient showing has been
made to warrant a finding that the desired inference or inferences
is or are natural or plausible (the most natural or plausible among
the various inferences conceivable).
Condensed explanation is advisable to disclose the purposes of this
working definition and the difficulties which it may not satisfactorily
solve:
(a) This portion of the draft combines several excerpts from the
Uniform Rules, with some change of wording and substance. 92 At
the very end, "truth of the matter stated," which is the terminology
of Rule 63, has been turned into "truth of the version." The change
has a double purpose. In the immediate connection, "matter" seems
most properly synonymous with "fact" in the sense of actuality as
distinguished from the other possible meaning of the formulation,
accurate or inaccurate, sincere or insincere, by any witness or other
declarant. The court-room actuality will of course be the determinative finding of the trier of fact. Introduction of the term
"version" properly indicates controversy as to the characteristics of
the "matter" or "fact," and prevents "matter" from slithering back
and forth between the first and second meanings. Also the terminology "matter stated" is inapt because definition (e) (1), as explained
below, includes the possibilities of manifestation by inference or
even by omission; it is embarrassing to couple the term "stated"
with the implications of these words. Such embarrassment indeed
extends to the fundamental word "statement" as embodying a
characteristic hearsay concept. But it is hard to conjure up a substitute word which will not seem stilted and artificial. Theoretically,
"intentional manifestation" might replace "statement," but the
resulting definition would become too outlandish for toleration.
(b) In the Uniform Rules, as well as in this paper, "conduct" and
"behavior" have been treated as substantially synonymous. 93 Part
(1) of the second sentence of this portion of the draft follows parts
of Uniform Rule 63 (4), which deals with its problem in terms of
a hearsay exception.94 Part (2) of this sentence accepts cross exami92. UNmroRm RuLE or EvImcE 63, opening lines; same RuLn, parts (1) and

(3).

.93.

UNFomv RuLE OF EVIDENCE 1 (6).

94. The phrasing is closely analogous to that commonly employed by opinions treating the requirements for admissibility of past perception recorded.
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nation as an adequate device for producing information, etc., which
will enable the trier of fact to appraise perception and memory.
Few cases are likely to arise under this part, because when the
sanctions of cross examination apply narrative evidence will almost
invariably be in the form of verbal statements, and thus fall under
(a) instead of (b). It is, however, possible for a witness on the
stand in one trial to make some intentionally significant gesture of
contempt, affection, menace, or the like which becomes relevant to
the issues of a later trial.
As in (a) of the definition it is here assumed that the concept
of cross examination includes the various devices of impeachment.
This is comparatively unimportant at the present point, since impeachment will usually be developed, if at all, when evidence of
the conduct or behavior is offered rather than at the normally
earlier time of original occurrence.
Under part (2) of the second sentence, the party against whom
the evidence is offered may or may not be the person who had
opportunity to cross examine when the conduct or behavior
occurred. If he is a different person, it becomes debatable whether
he should be subjected to the risk of evidence originally developed
against only the other's opposition. The case for admitting such
evidence under (b) is stronger than under (a), since by hypothesis
(b) presents no issue of sincerity, only perception or memory or
both being at issue. 95 In this connection, too, a question lies open
as to whether opportunity to cross examine should be accepted as a
fair equivalent of actualcross examination.9
In the second sentence it will be observed that the meaning of
"matter" must be kept synonymous with actualfact.
The presumption stated in the last sentence of (b) of course
becomes subject to local practice respecting methods and effect of
rebuttal.
(c) This is inserted to head off any claim of a vague undefined
surplus of hearsay.
(d) A meticulously cautious form of this provision would explain
that hearsay exceptions may arise by common law, statute, court
Here, at least as much as with problems of adequate perception, allowance

has to be made for differing rigors of the preliminary showing; various
aspects of memory are subject to different rates of deterioration. Hutchins &
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 41 HARV. L.
REv. 860, 865-67 (1928).
95. Ordinary reported testimony consisting of statements offered for their
assertive value does involve the risk of insincerity; this may have a certain
tendency to justify its treatment as involving an exception to the hearsay
rule.
96. Under the exception for reported testimony, this equivalence is established. Cf. Comment appended to UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 63 (3) (b).
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rule, and perhaps otherwise. But this would complicate the sentence, and probably not change its interpretation.
(e) (1) This definition is derived from Uniform Rule 62 (1) but
with considerable change. The Uniform Rule speaks of "not only
an oral or written expression but also non-verbal conduct . . ." the
opening words of which inadequately cover the varieties of verbal
expression. How about a message wigwagged by signal flags or
tapped off on a telegraph key without recording at the receiving
end? The broad more generalized form of words here proposed
seems safer.
The deaf mute communicating extrajudicially by eloquent gestures of course utters verbal hearsay. A young child utters hearsay
(possibly non-verbal) when, being asked if he sees the person at
whose hands he suffered mistreatment, he says no words but points
responsively to a particular individual.97 The gangster utters a
kind of hearsay when he ostentatiously performs actions intended
to communicate a sense of his own guilt, with the purpose of diverting suspicion from an associate9
Purely internal mental formulation of a version of some matter
may sometimes be relevant-e.g., reasonable belief by a trustee as
bearing upon the propriety of his behavior in exercising or refraining from exercising a discretionary power. However, litigation of
an issue as to such formulation will not involve hearsay evidence
emanating from the formulator unless some sort of manifestation by
him is made a vehicle of proof.9 The manifestation, though, need
not be immediately communicated to raise an ultimate hearsay
problem. He may, for instance, secretly record his belief in a
writing which comes to light later.
Marginal modes of manifestation have raised some doubt. Consider as an example the giving of orders or instructions necessarily
based upon factual determinations reached by the speaker or writer,
but intended only to cause appropriate action by the persons ordered
or instructed, and not intended to communicate to them the content of the determinations. Evidence of the orders or instructions
offered to establish inferentially the determinations and from them
existence of the fundamental facts seems to the present author to
97. But see note 19 supra.
98. The behavior may be sincere and not a lie by dumb show. But the
party against whom the evidence is offered can justly claim opportunity to
test this issue in standard fashion. Furthermore, adequacy of perception and
memory may well be at issue.
99. Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 469, 473, 67 S.E.2d 639, 643, 646
(1951), is the source of the illustration in the text; it involved an unsent
letter; the manifestation took the form of the writer's successful presentation
of the letter in his own favor; grounds for admission are not stated in crystal
clear fashion.

1961]

HEARSAY SYSTEM

have hearsay quality. It is immaterial that the speaker or writer
gave no thought to communicating his determinations.10° This line
of analysis can be carried a step further by assuming a negative
desire to conceal through omission an underlying determination.
Suppose a police officer asks W, an enemy of X, whether a certain
typed document was in W's opinion written on X's typewriter. W,
an expert on identification of typewriting, knows that his truthful
and frank answer would be: "The appearance of the document-is
consistent with its having been so written. But I cannot on the
evidence thus far presented to me express a sincere opinion that it
was in fact so written." Desiring to inculpate X and yielding to
his enmity, W answers by speaking only the first of the two sentences quoted above. At X's trial, acute and honest prosecuting
counsel refrain from using W as a witness, and equally acute defense
counsel offers evidence of W's one sentence statement as tending
to prove that attribution of the writing is dubious. Here W hoped
that the particular inference would pass unperceived by virtue of
his deceptively purposeful omission; yet he realized its propriety,
consciously risked it, and so made an intentional manifestation
which boomeranged into the version desired by X's lawyers. This
too, the present writer thinks, should fall within (e) (1). But does
it under the submitted wording? Should the definition say explicitly
that "manifestation" may be explicit or by inference or omission?
(f) This provision borrows Wigmore's wording at the end of
the sentence. Technically speaking, it does not belong in a definition
of hearsay. It is really a procedural generality whittled down to
fit a particular purpose. But that purpose perhaps can only be
adequately served by such limited explicitness.
On the whole, what has been accomplished so far in the way of
a proposal is not at all spectacular or drastic. The foregoing definition is no more than an effort to state with some precision and
detail a view of the proper scope of hearsay which is quite generally
entertained. There is, however, always some merit to precision,
particularly in a field of probative law so long befogged by memories of Tatham v. Wright and by fitful revival of like uncertainties
in the minds of perplexed lawyers who perhaps have never carefully studied that remarkable litigation.

IV. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Down to this point, discussion has been bent particularly upon a
100. Where determination is followed, particularly in an emergency, immediately by the order or instruction, analogy to the hearsay exception for
spontaneous exclamations or declarations irresistibly suggests itself. Cf. note
82 supra.
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region which Professor McCormick aptly dubbed the borderland of
hearsay-an area still better suited to explorers than to placid homesteaders. Turning inward from the borderland to the more settled
and familiar area of unquestionable hearsay, we find the latter
speckled with exceptions. Making an overall census of these exceptions, the Uniform Rules report a total count of 30 or thereabouts. 0 1
This number is altogether too high for effectiveness. The best trial
lawyer may not remember all possibly relevant exceptions in moments
of emergency. Worse than that, the list in the Uniform Rules is a
sort of practical idealization, much more nearly systematic and harmonious than the shaping of exceptions, involving a mixture of
common law and statute, actually applied in an average court system.
It is very hard indeed to hold clearly in mind all their varying prerequisites and limitations, some of the latter being quite arbitrary. 102
Finally, and this is fundamentally serious, few if any lawyers or
scholars can succinctly collate the hearsay exceptions in common use,
let alone intelligibly state the measure of their aggregate effect upon
our law of proof.
Such dubious total adequacy, so coupled with confusing multiplicity,
automatically generates suggestions:
(1) Consolidation of exceptions is probably more serviceable than
further proliferation. Quite surely the prize modern example in the
United States of useful liberalization and simplification through consolidation has been the nation-wide legislative movement toward
comprehensive provisions to facilitate admissibility of regular business entries. For this development the work of Professor Morgan's
Commonwealth Fund Committee, prosecuted nearly 40 years ago,
deserves the utmost credit.103 The result has been implementation on
a broad front for common sense presentation of reliable, systematic
evidence respecting trade, business, and professional transactions. All
the merits of several related common-law hearsay exceptions are
retained, their kinks and crotchets largely extirpated, and their collective utility greatly broadened. 104
This sort of work may not be confined to legislatures. There is cur101. The exact number of subheads in Rule 63 is thirty-one, but it is
arguable that one or more of these describe matter properly excluded from
a precise definition. On the other hand, there may be some lumping of
exceptions under single subheads (e.g., Rule 63 (4)).
102. Consider such crabbed oddities as the common law forms of exceptions for dying declarations and declarations against interest.
103. Morgan et al., THE LAW OF EVIDENcE: SOME PRoPOsALS FOR ITS REFORM,
52-63 (Commonwealth Fund 1927). The kinship of this to the UNIFORm BuSINESS RECORDS AS EviDENcE ACT (UBREA), promulgated by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1936, is obvious.
104. Such wet blankets as Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), are fortunately rare.
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rently moving forward at the hands of the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire a carefully deliberate extension of hearsay admissibility,
case by case, shrewdly tied in each instance to the most closely related
precedents but relying upon a broad formula of necessity plus apparent trustworthiness. 0 5 The process just described inevitably works
toward breaking down common law partitions between exceptions
106
and therefore toward simplification as well as liberalization.
(2) Another current procedural development, which still has a
long way to go in the United States, has bearing upon rules permitting
freer introduction of hearsay. Particular hearsay categories necessarily contain, if followed instance by instance, some reliable and
105. Gagnon v. Pronovost, 97 N.H. 500, 502-03, 92 A.2d 904, 905 (1952)
(decedent's memorandum book, although not kept in regular course of business); Perry v. Parker, 101 N.H. 295, 297, 141 A.2d 883 (1958) (recorded plan

of surveyor made between 25 and 30 years previously); O'Haire v. Breton,
102 N.H. 448, 159 A.2d 805, 807-08 (1960) (report by engineer, since deceased,
on fitness and adequacy of a well; involves expert opinion as well as hearsay). Perry v. Parker refers to the standard rationale which Wigmore
worked out to give a backbone of common sense to the hearsay exceptions"the principle of necessity and the principle of circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness." 101 N.H. at 297, 141 A.2d at 884. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§
1421-23, 1427 (3d ed. 1940) (the last reference setting out a much more radical
suggestion). This same New Hampshire opinion, quoting in part from McCORMcK, EVIDNCE § 305 (1954), says: "The fundamental inquiry is not the
name or number of the exceptions to the hearsay rule ... but whether 'under
the circumstances [the evidence] satisfies the reasons which lie behind the
exceptions'
101 N.H. at 297, 141 A.2d at 884. (Italics in original text.) Cf.
THAv RELMNR TREATISE ON EVIUEN
AT
t COMMON LAW 522 (1898),
deploring the uncertain multiplicity of hearsay exceptions: "A true analysis
would probably restate the law so as to make what we call the hearsay rule
the exception, and make our main rule this, namely, that whatsoever is
relevant is admissible." For many further references consult Weinstein,
Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331, 342-46 (1961). Attention
is particularly invited to the enlightened opinion by Judge Wisdom in Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388, 393, 398 (5th Cir.
1961), which has become available in full text only since preparation of the
manuscript for this article; the opinion emphasizes relevancy, materiality,
necessity and trustworthiness of the hearsay admitted.
106. Also it is safer, if slower, than more grandiose judicial efforts. See
the majority and minority attitudes-the latter phrased by Vanderbilt, C.J.in Robertson v. Hackensack Trust Co., 1 N.J. 304, 309-24, 63 A.2d 515, 517-25
(1949) (unsuccessful effort by the forceful Chief Justice in a concurring
opinion to persuade his colleagues to liberalize hearsay admissibility with
respect to declarations of unavailable persons; only one other member of
the court was recruited). The subsequent influence of this effort runs in
diminuendo. Dolan v. Chesler, 5 N.J. Super. 313, 315, 317-19, 68 A.2d 885,
886-87, 888-89 (1949), petition for certification denied, 3 N.J. 514, 71 A.2d 238
(1950); Welch v. Essex County, 6 N.J. Super. 422, 428, 68 A.2d 787 (1949),
aff'd, 6 N.J. Super. 184, 70 A.2d 779 (1950); In re Allen's Estate, 18 N.J. Super.
63, 65, 86 A.2d 704, 705 (1952) (seeming expression of regret that Vanderbilt
lead cannot be followed); In re Spiegelglass, 48 N.J. Super. 265, 273, 137 A.2d
440, 444 (1958) (referring to "much cited dissenting [sic] opinion"), petition
for certification denied, 26 N.J. 302, 139 A.2d 588 (1958); Band's Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 62 N.J. Super. 522, 557-61, 163 A.2d 465,
484-86 (1960) (treating the proposal of the Vanderbilt concurring opinion as
not law), petition for certification denied, 33 N.J. 387, 164 A.2d 849 (1960).
But see note I supra for the present status of hearsay reform in New Jersey.
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other quite unreliable items. It is tempting to meet such variability
by giving trial judges some range of discretion as to admissibility.
But it is uncomfortable to go to trial without knowing whether impor-tant evidence will be let in or excluded. If and so far as pretrial
investigation extends to competency of questionable evidence, that
particular discomfort vanishes.
(3) What may be called revision in a middle dimension, as sketched
by the preceding paragraphs, need not rule out either revision in
comparatively narrow detail or revision on the grand scale. All three
processes are naturally linked. Consider, for instance, the possibilities
of an instance of narrow detail beautifully carved out by Professor
Falknor. He proposes, at the end of a tightly reasoned critical article,
that evidence of silence or other inaction by any person, not constituting a statement (as hitherto defined'0 7) of the version of a matter it
is offered to prove inferentially, but so offered as to call for reliance
upon the person's perception or memory, shall not be subject to
exclusion because of its hearsay character if (1) the judge finds that
the person had perceived the matter and (2) the conduct would have
been detrimental to the person unless the inference sought to be
drawn from it is correct.0 8 The concrete illustration of this abstract
phrasing is an offer of evidence that X, a purchaser and user of goods,
made no complaint to the seller, the offeror's purpose being to prove
that the goods were of adequately satisfactory quality. If adopted,
this proposal would add an additional complication-probably worthwhile in and of itself-to the hearsay system, but might well serve
as an entering wedge opening the way for a broader exception covering evidence of non-assertive conduct at large.10 9 If a small liberalization may help to make another of medium size, an aggregation of
medium sized liberalizations manifestly may merge in a grand scale
development.
(4) At this point, it is the part of wisdom to stop, look, and listen.
Profuse admission of evidence may be evil instead of good, if the
evidence is unreliable or unnecessary. Doubt has already been expressed as to existence of a really adequate collation of the effect of
the numerous hearsay exceptions already in being. Perhaps the most
likely trial areas for the kind of trouble with the hearsay rule, by
way either of excessive stringency or undue laxity, which ought to be
107. See p. 769 supra.
108. This wording is not that of Professor Falknor himself, but a paraphrase ventured by the present writer in language which conforms to that
offered on pp. 769-70 supra for a definition of hearsay. Apology is due if
Professor Falknor has been misinterpreted. See Falknor, Silence, 89 U. PA.
L. REv. 192 at 216-17 (1940).
109. Such indeed is the exact setting in which Professor Falknor placed it.
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alleviated are criminal cases and civil personal injury and wrongful
death cases. In many aspects of such litigation it is impossible regularly to assure through effectively applied foresight competent nonhearsay evidence for proper establishment of the actual crucial facts.
Were there available a collective statement of judgment by a large
group of lawyers thoroughly experienced in the matters indicated" 0
respecting the extent to which hearsay exceptions now applicable
over-correct or under-correct recurrent and unavoidable difficulties
of proof, talk about further shaping of the exceptions would get firmer
footing."'
CONCLUSION

John Marsden was a dull dog at best. He had no power of origination, and very little of response to conversational stimulus, as the
painter James Lonsdale found to his own boredom. 112 Marsden got
along without too much trouble, at least after he grew up and came
into money, by due attention to the conventionalities of a country
gentleman's life-a great deal of eating and sometimes too much
drinking, lavish hospitality, the ceremonial giving of routine toasts,
some pretense of riding to hounds, and occasional restrained political
activity.
Hence, as previously asserted, it was more than a little anomalous
that his death and the consequent efforts to validate his will should
have caused a fervid and hugely expensive controversy along the
shadowy edges of the good old conventionalized hearsay rule. The
case was won and lost, becoming a diminishing episode in legal history. Nothing clearly constructive resulted; the profession received
an indeterminate warning of evidential risks, but without systematically striving to define them and appraise their practical consequences slumped back into a Marsden-like lethargy of undiscerning
convention.
Since the 1830's a good deal has been done here and there to the
hearsay system, much of it unquestionably desirable. But there has
never yet been a real overall overhauling. Precise analysts and
110. Who would be sure to have varying views, not only because of individualization of judgment and experience but also because the field splits
into various specialities. A lawyer concentrating in workmen's compensation
cases might well respond that he did not have to do much wresting with the
hearsay rule, for in the tribunals of primary jurisdiction before which he

appears there is almost sure to be relaxation of strict common law evidentiary
exclusion.
111. Whether the methods employed by the excellent Committee responsible for the Commonwealth Fund report, supra note 103,-mainly questionnaires and correspondence-would now be the best available for compilation
of such a statement is an important and interesting point. Modern large
organizations of trial lawyers might be willing to help by mass discussion.
112. See note 25 supra.
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would-be reformers, who have seen a lot of hard work disregarded,
might be pardoned for yielding to the calm despair mentioned early
by the soul-searching of Tennyson's "In Memoriam." This paper is
meant to express the hope that they will regroup their forces and keep
on trying.

